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One of the most obvious reasons why historians — both professional and academic — 
find it difficult to challenge hegemonic narratives is psychological. No one wants to be 
a pariah in their own society by running against the mainstream and finding themselves 
in an isolated position. But I think there’s a deeper level as to why historians have found 
it so difficult (maybe unlike some of their colleagues in the social sciences), to provide 
narratives which challenge those which dominate their society’s media, culture and 
academia.  And that reason, I think, is that challenging historiographical mythology is 
not just about facts, it is also about rethinking the role of the historian.  It is about being 
able to update oneself on developments in historiography and even (which is perhaps 
more difficult for historians), in philosophy. This focuses the question on what is 
reality, what is fiction, what is myth, and what is a fact. I found that one of the most 
challenging tasks in dealing with the history of my own country, both for Jewish and 
Palestinian historians, was not just to provide a different narrative to the one that 
prevails, but also to be able to tie in concrete discussion with a more epistemological 
understanding of what history is and how history is received by the public at large.   
 
There was a conference in Florence many years ago in which I gave a paper about 
construction of national historiographies. I argued that there were differences in the way 
historians worked in, what I termed, ‘relaxed societies’ or in ‘tense societies’. I thought 
that in tense societies, where people were writing on an ongoing conflict, the histories 
of that conflict would be unable, and shouldn’t be encouraged, to deal too deeply with 
more theoretical questions about the nature of reality and history. One might expect the 
historians in more relaxed societies to do the job for us.  But I realised I was wrong: it 
really depended on the conditions in which you find yourself, rather than the state of the 
society. I found quite a lot of tense historians in relaxed societies and I regard myself to 
be a very relaxed historian in a very tense society.   
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I want to use two anecdotes which will show that I think the dialectical connection 
between the general epistemological debates — about what is truth, what is objectivity, 
what is subjectivity in history — and a more concrete search into the past, is far more 
complex than people sometimes think.  In 1997 in the village of Isawia, which is just 
adjacent to the Hebrew University’s campus on Mount Scopus in Jerusalem, I founded 
with a friend of mine, Jemil Hillad, a group which was called The Palestinian Israeli 
Academic Dialogue.  It had also a different name, we first called it The Bridging 
Narrative Group, and the idea was to bring together Israeli and Palestinian historians to 
construct jointly a narrative for the country.  
 
I was asked to open it with an inaugural speech to the group in which I would talk about 
historiography, philosophy and national narratives. I started by arguing that any such 
attempt to bridge narrative between historians of two conflicting national groups has to 
adopt at least a ‘soft’ relativist approach to the writing of history, which annoyed both 
my Palestinian and my Jewish colleagues. Most of them are empiricist and positivist 
historians, who really believe that all you need is the documents and then you can really 
reconstruct the past.  For them von Ranke’s ideas are still very much the dominating 
guideline.   
 
While I was using the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer to show the 
connection between hermeneutics and history, the connection between understanding a 
text and an historical event, we heard the clatter of machine guns next to the house 
where we had our meeting. I should say we met in a private house because no 
university, either Israeli or Palestinian, would host a group of Israeli and Palestinians 
who wanted to construct a joint narrative rather than provide scaffolding for the national 
narrative. The soldiers burst into the meeting because they were looking for one of our 
historians, one of our Palestinian historians, and they took him out. And in that moment 
I lost all motivation to talk about Gadamer and I became a very positivist historian. 
 
A year later, in Paris, the late Edward Said convened a meeting. On the basis of the idea 
of that bridging narrative group, I had convinced him to convene a meeting between 
Israeli and Palestinian historians which was sponsored by Le Monde and held in the 
Hall of the French Senate, which hosts 1,000 people. It was a huge meeting, to our great 
surprise – or maybe it was because we had Daniel Barenboim sitting in the first row, not 
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understanding at all what we are talking about, but his very presence there probably 
brought a lot of other people thinking he would provide a piano recital at the end.  We 
discussed again the question of history and historiography.  The main speaker there was 
my colleague Benny Morris who claimed that the only way of understanding what 
happened in Palestine was to use the Israeli military archives because they were the 
only reliable source of the history of Palestine. That triggered, to my great pleasure, a 
response by Said about which I don’t think he has written anywhere, unfortunately.  So 
it is solely in my memory although I hope that one day I will find the tape of it, as it 
really should be produced in writing. Said explained to Morris, and I think to the public 
at large, why an historical document in the military archives is also an interpretation of 
reality, especially if it had been written by an Israeli officer writing about events in a 
certain village. Additionally he said, “One wonders about historians who write about the 
tragedy of another people without any empathy for that tragedy. Can we really then say 
that their books, like Morris’s book about the birth of the refugee problem, are not 
flawed, just by fact that they have been written by someone who had no sympathy for 
the tragedy or catastrophe about which they were writing”.  
 
And I think between the two events in Isawia and in Paris, this dialectical connection 
between how one should relate to history as part of a political project, not just as part of 
a professional project, is really something that would trouble both Israeli and 
Palestinian historians.  I would like to suggest several guidelines for such a project in 
the future and also highlight some of the difficulties which should be associated with 
such a project. Because I think that it redefines, at least where I come from, the role of 
professional historians. In our system, both in Israel and in Palestine where most 
universities are public and not private, historians are financed by the state itself or by, in 
the case of the Palestinian, by the Palestinian Authority itself. How far can we go in 
challenging the kind of narrative that our financers expect us to produce? What is our 
role towards our society? I think that my first guideline is that we have to be very wary 
and apprehensive about taking a very positivist point of view about historiography. In 
other words, if we claim to be purely scientific researchers, objective, unbiased and we 
produce narratives that either serve our masters or irritate them; we would lose 
credibility in the eyes of the public. Obviously this situation would produce a narrative 
that challenges our master’s voice and then there are already two narratives. And what 
are we going to tell our public? That because we are good scientific researchers our 
narrative is correct and the narrative of our masters is wrong? We know what would be 
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the next stage. They could easily find professional historians who would do the 
opposite, namely who would say: “We have researched properly. In fact we have had 
better access because we have better connections with the government, so have also 
seen some declassified material which our more antagonistic colleagues cannot see, so 
this is really the complete picture”.   
 
I think there’s some modesty and humility, and some very productive sense in telling 
the public that things are not very clear and, indeed, that things are still very unclear in 
many ways. The fact that we are part of an ongoing conflict and that as educated people 
we are also very deeply involved in that conflict, not just as historians but also as 
academics and intellectuals, means that indeed there is an interaction between our 
ideological world and the final product of our historiographical research. Although my 
colleagues in the joint Israeli-Palestinian effort to reconstruct a narrative at first very 
much objected to my more relativist point of view (mistaking it, by the way, for a post-
modernist kind of approach where ‘everything goes’), I think as the years went by, and 
we’ve already been meeting for almost for a decade, they understand that this was really 
necessary for incrementally building a trust between historians and their societies about 
the past. I’m willing to say something more about it if there is time but I think the 
relativist approach is the first precondition.  I shall call it the ‘soft’ relativist approach. I 
realise that this is not the best term, but those of you who are familiar with the 
historiographical debate over the late 50 years would understand what I mean by that. 
 
The second necessary precondition for building a joint narrative is, of course, a great 
belief in the role of history in conflicts.  In other words, historians suddenly find 
themselves, not sidelined but, contrary to their wishes, very much in the centre of the 
political debate.  In the case of Israel and Palestine, this is very obvious.  The question 
of whether or not an ethnic cleansing took place in 1948 is crucial for the future debate 
about the solution for the Palestinian refugee problem.  This is a purely historical 
question to begin with – the question of responsibility, the question of defining the 
historical event and finding the political implication.  Now if the Israeli point of view is 
accepted, there was no ethnic cleansing, hence there is no Israeli responsibility hence 
there is no need to deal with the refugee problem as part of the conflict. From the 
Palestinian point of view, there was an ethnic cleansing and therefore there is an Israeli 
responsibility and therefore future negotiations of peace and reconciliation in Palestine 
should focus on the issue of refugees.   
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It was very interesting to see how the negotiators during the Oslo accord in 1993, on 
both sides, used history for advancing their cause.  In the beginning of the Oslo 
negotiations, the Palestinian negotiators were very suspicious about the willingness of 
the Israeli side really to deal with the issue of the refugees. So the Israeli negotiators, in 
fact the chief negotiator at the time, Yossi Beilin, produced my book and others to show 
the Palestinian negotiators that indeed there is new thinking in Israel about the refugee 
issue.  He said, “There you are, you see we have historians who talk about ethnic 
cleansing, we’re definitely going to respect your point of view.”  In the summer of 
2000, when the Israeli negotiating position had totally changed and they told the 
Palestinians that the refugee issue was not a issue, it was the Palestinian negotiators 
who produced our books and said, “But don’t you understand, there are historians in 
your society who have already recognised that what happened in Palestine in 1948 was 
an ethnic cleansing operation.” So history is used and abused by politicians and 
historians should be aware that they are part of the political debate as much as they part 
of the intellectual debate. 
 
The third guideline or condition that really emerged out of the dialogue, the very 
constructive dialogue that we still have between Israeli and Palestinian historians, is that 
if we — speaking simplistically — distance ourselves from elite politics and elite 
history, by adopting a quite cynical, even negative attitude towards politicians on both 
sides as people who made history and who affect history, then the non-elite history is 
much easier to produce as a joint project.  It is the political elites’ histories which are 
very difficult to bridge between. We found this in the case of Palestine particularly in 
the case of the history of workers and of women.  These two fields are relatively easily 
reconstructed jointly and once they are liberated from the national narrative of both 
sides which totally excluded them, neglected them and in fact victimised them as far as 
an historical narrative can victimise people, when compared to actual victimisation of 
course.  And when we started working together on the history of the movements of 
workers in Palestine we found out that both national leaderships, the Palestinian and the 
Jewish, had made every effort to undermine any attempt by Arab and Jewish workers to 
unite on the basis of class consciousness or class solidarity, and to question the need to 
unite on the basis of a national or ethnic or religious base. I think that this by itself was 
not just an important highlighting of a very dark area or lacuna in the historiography of 
both sides, it was also a very important message for the future, about groups that do not 
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belong to the political elites and how they fare. Because national narratives, national 
interpretations of reality, not only in the past, but also in the present, dominate our life.  
The same was true about feminist historiography, which is very limited in both cases. In 
fact it was through the attempts to bridge a building narrative that that kind of 
historiography found a much easier way of getting into the main domain of 
historiography.  I think this was particularly true about the Palestinian side where the 
best that feminist historiography could produce at the time was finding out how much 
women on the one hand contribute to the national effort and how much this effort was 
not recognised once the national struggle came to a halt or to a lull. I think it was 
through the bridging narrative effort that it was possible to widen the scope of the 
historical research into the dialectical relationship between nationalism and women’s 
rights and histories.  This again is not just a matter of an intellectual curiosity about 
what happened in the past, it is of course far more important as a way of understanding 
what is ahead of us in the future, something which positivist historians find very 
alarming when you tell them that their works really should take that into account. 
 
Fourthly, we dealt – and again there was a lot of opposition—with the impact of 
modernisation theories on historiography, not only in the case of Israel and Palestine 
but, I think, in the case of historiographies in the decolonised world altogether.  The 
obvious point of view which we all share, and that was the easy one, is that you have to 
liberate the historiography of Palestine from modernisationist theories because it 
supports one of the side story and totally negates the other side of the story, in other 
words because Zionism was part of the West and part of the colonialist world it was 
very clear that if you are loyal to modernisationist theories that see the West as the 
source of all change, of all progress, then of course you immediately side with a Zionist 
historiography of Palestine, even without being a practising historian.  That is to say, 
even if you are toddler in a kindergarten and you understand basically that the West is a 
superior moral and intellectual force in the world, it’s very clear to you that you belong 
as a Jew to the right camp. Of course if you are a historian, which is a bit better than a 
toddler, then of course you can even thicken this narrative with details and convincing 
arguments.  Far more difficult for the Palestinian historians was to realise that they are 
as much enslaved by modernisationist theories as were we, the Israeli historians. 
Because nationalism, anti-colonialist nationalism, is also part of the modernisation 
theories. In fact it is an integral part of a modernisationist westernised historiography to 
predict that after civilisation or after civilised enlightened ideas are brought from the 
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outside into the inside, these would be the only reason for the dynamics of change and 
development. This means that a very successful westernisation of local non-westernised 
society is that the primitive people would realise what nationalism is all about and of 
course would want to be civilised themselves and therefore rebel against the domination 
of the foreign colonialist movement. Hence, the whole idea that Palestine could only be 
liberated if an elite, a political elite in Palestine could adopt western concepts of 
civilisation, politics, and morality as the way forward, was no less problematic that the 
idea of the Zionist elite that the best thing for the Palestinian was to be led towards 
modernity and enlightenment by the Zionists themselves, being the bearers of the 
message of modernisation. 
 
Now in order to push forward this idea, that you don’t only have to liberate your 
historiographies from the national domination to de-nationalise your historiography, 
you have to de-modernise it in many ways, one had to convince oneself, and our 
Palestinian partners— indeed this was the enabling move —to widen the group of 
people who joined us in the effort to build a bridging narrative.  We found out that 
historians who were closer to the Islamic movement in Palestine were willing to join the 
effort once we were talking in such terms. Because what does it mean?  It means that 
you do not regard, as you do in modernisationist theories, that the past itself or tradition 
and religion are barriers for development, or are the human concepts that do not allow 
societies to thrive, or be enlightened, which is something which was common both to 
the Palestinian national historiography and the Israeli nationalist historiography. They 
both regarded the past as an inflexible time that it was much better for the people on 
both sides to get rid of. They regarded tradition and religion as two interpretations of 
realities that would not allow people to move forward.  And of course as those of you 
who are familiar with the varieties of feminist historiography on the Middle East would 
realise, these concepts have been re-evaluated. It is not a coincidence that at the same 
date there were two very big and apparently contradictory demonstrations held.  There 
was a big mass demonstration in Ankara by women demanding of the Turkish 
government that it allow women to wear the veil in Turkish universities as a sign of 
self-identity and respect against an oppressive Turkish government. And on the same 
date there was a demonstration in Iran by women demanding the right to remove the 
veil with the same kind of agenda. And this kind of interaction is very important if we 
want to widen the scope of the historiographical project. The de-modernisationist 
approach, so to speak, enabled us to look at internal factors, internal forces in Palestine, 
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in what probably would be defined by western historians as a pre-modern era, as being 
the forces of change, the forces of development, the forces that maybe did not move as 
fast as the westernised forces wanted them to move, but moved at a much more 
adequate pace with regard to the society around them. 
 
And I would like to conclude by saying that the fifth and last precondition was much 
more concrete and maybe much methodological, in a way, but I think it has also wider 
implications. This dealt with the hierarchy of sources.  It was very clear that if you 
adopt a modernisationist point of view, a nationalist point of view, an elitist point of 
view (which were all the kinds of points of view we were trying to challenge), you are a 
great believer in the written document. You deal only with relics which are left behind 
by the political elite. They leave behind them mountains of papers. Anyone who has 
been in the public records office can see the glimmer in the eyes of the historians when 
they leave the cafeteria to move into the shrine of truth, which is the British Public 
Record Office. This is of course full of documents written by British diplomats who 
kept lying about the truth, but never mind, there is a lustre of truth in this shrine, like in 
any national archive I would think. They would know that it is a very accessible source 
for reconstructing history, especially if we’re talking about graduates from Oxford and 
Cambridge who have a very articulate way, even already in the 1920s, to write about 
that reality. So all you have to do as an historian is just to use it, to find some 
connecting sentences and you have a very lucid description of the reality. But of course 
this was NOT the reality, this was a British diplomat sitting somewhere in the Middle 
East, having all the prejudices in the world to direct him, while he was producing a 
certain survey of the reality. The same is true about many of the political assessments 
and surveys that we have of the past. And it’s quite interesting, in fact quite intriguing, 
how historians would, probably rightly, be very suspicious about contemporary 
politicians when they describe to them the reality around them. But if there is a thick, or 
even a thin layer of dust over a politician’s assessment from 50 years ago, it suddenly 
becomes an authentic and objective description of reality – but of course only if it fits 
the historian’s point of view, consciously or unconsciously. So the written document 
becomes the only and exclusive way of describing reality because it is the elites’ point 
of view. And in fact the elites were educated enough to leave the evidence behind them 
for contemporary modern historians. 
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But if we go into a more expansive area of history, then we have a very different point 
of view. I’m sure you’re all familiar with how the kit of the historian has changed in the 
last 100 years thanks to such schools of thought as the Annales in France. Other 
interactions between historians and social scientists, have produced multiple ways of 
reconstructing the past. You don’t only need written documents, you need these as well 
as other means if you are interested in finding out about a much more complex history, 
the history of the non-elite groups. And that is not as definite and it isn’t taken as being 
as definite as the history of politics or the history of politicians. And almost in the last 
moment, and with this I will end, because of our agreement as a group of historians, we 
dealt with oral history, putting oral history on the same pedestal as written history or 
written documents, and thus succeeded in enlightening ourselves and hopefully also the 
people who would read our work, about 1948. Because one of the major obstacles for 
moving on with the joint narrative, or the bridging narrative project, was the fact that 
the Israeli historians felt rightly that to talk about ethnic cleansing in Palestine was not 
the full picture of what happened in 1948. Because in 1948 the State of Israel came into 
being and in 1948 there were some heroic stories about how Jews in isolated settlement 
defended themselves against large Arab armies. The question was, how can it be that an 
ethnic cleansing operation can sit comfortably together with a story of national 
independence?   
 
What the oral history enabled us to do was to find out that in fact even in a small 
country like Palestine in 1948, the concept of war is very misleading. Only in certain 
geographical areas did you have a proper war, one small army confronting another 
small army, the Egyptian army versus the Israeli army, the Syrian army versus the 
Israeli army, but this was limited to certain areas. In fact in the rest of the country, there 
were not two armies clashing with each other, there was a military force, the Israeli 
military force operating within a non-military environment. We started using known 
concepts and definitions of ethnic cleansing like the ones which are provided by the 
State department and United Nations and it fitted very well into what the Israeli army 
was doing in between the beginning of 1948 and the end of 1948, within the Palestine 
territories.  I think the very fact that the Palestinian historians were willing to say that 
apart from the ethnic cleansing other things were happening as well and the fact that the 
Jewish historians were willing to say that apart from what they thought was happening 
in terms of the building of a new society, an ethnic cleansing operation also happened, 
that the one did not exclude the other. This assessment was only possible through oral 
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history, and why is that?  Because the Israeli archives have never revealed the full 
extent of the ethnic cleansing.  The Palestinians are keeping the archives of memory 
through successive generations of Palestinians. That’s what’s amazing about archives of 
memory, they can be taken to a generation that has not lived through that period.  The 
archives of memory completed the picture. I think that humanising the stories on the 
one hand, and showing how limited the political and military archives were on the other 
hand, really created the constructive work that we’re doing now.  
 
To sum up I would say that the tasks facing historians who want to challenge, or need to 
challenge, dominating narratives are far beyond the question of finding new evidence 
that someone else didn’t know about, or directing the spotlight onto evidence that other 
people do not want to face. This is definitely part of the task ahead. But I think no less 
important is something that historians would probably find sometimes more difficult to 
digest, and that is the need to have a much more interdisciplinary approach to what 
history is all about, a better understanding of the various disciplines to deal with the 
human sciences and the interpretation of reality.  In the process this means losing some 
of the scientific and objective air that accompanied the work of historians in such 
societies.  We would become instead much more like parliamentarians who represent 
different points of view than like the priest who represents the only existing truth. 
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